{"id":14626,"date":"2026-05-07T10:49:57","date_gmt":"2026-05-07T10:49:57","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/globalnewstoday.uk\/index.php\/2026\/05\/07\/reasserting-public-scrutiny-over-indonesias-foreign-policy-the-diplomat-asia-pacific\/"},"modified":"2026-05-07T10:49:57","modified_gmt":"2026-05-07T10:49:57","slug":"reasserting-public-scrutiny-over-indonesias-foreign-policy-the-diplomat-asia-pacific","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/globalnewstoday.uk\/index.php\/2026\/05\/07\/reasserting-public-scrutiny-over-indonesias-foreign-policy-the-diplomat-asia-pacific\/","title":{"rendered":"Reasserting Public Scrutiny Over Indonesia\u2019s Foreign Policy – The Diplomat \u2013 Asia-Pacific"},"content":{"rendered":"

Read The Diplomat<\/span>, <\/span>Know The Asia-Pacific
At a time when Jakarta’s foreign policy decisions are particularly consequential and sometimes controversial, public scrutiny of them has strangely diminished.
Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto shakes hands with Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese during a joint press conference in Jakarta, Indonesia, Feb. 6, 2026.
From time to time, Indonesians have proven themselves attentive to foreign affairs. Public opinion has often been shaped \u2013 sometimes sharply \u2013 by how the government manages its international relations. Episodes such as the Brunei-gate<\/em><\/a> controversy under Abdurrahman Wahid, the Tangguh gas export deal<\/a> with China during Megawati Soekarnoputri\u2019s presidency, and the intense debates over China-related issues in the era of Joko \u201cJokowi\u201d Widodo all demonstrate that foreign policy has never been immune from domestic contestation. Media coverage has often amplified these debates. It somewhat turns diplomatic choices into matters of public judgment.
Nowhere was this more evident than in Indonesia\u2019s engagement with China under Jokowi. His administration elevated China into one of Indonesia\u2019s top three sources of foreign direct investment, particularly in terms of large-scale infrastructure projects. Yet this deepening partnership also prompted anxieties. The arrival of Chinese workers, who were often perceived to live exclusive, \u00a0insulated lives at worksites, sparked fears among local communities about job displacement. These concerns, at times, spilled into racialized narratives that dominated headlines and public discourse.
Media coverage played a central role in magnifying these sentiments. One of the most controversial moments came when Tempo magazine published its August\u2013September 2015 edition<\/a>, featuring a cover that depicted Jokowi with slanted eyes alongside the headline \u201cWelcome Chinese Laborers.\u201d The sentiment reached its peak during the COVID\u201119 pandemic. In April 2020, at the beginning of the pandemic, The Jakarta Post<\/a> reported on local distrust toward Chinese workers, framing it as a potential flashpoint in Indonesia\u2013China relations. Yet these examples were only a fraction of the overwhelming media attention devoted to the issue. The scale of the coverage often mismatched the complexity of the reality.
What makes this wave of criticism striking is its inconsistency. Jokowi\u2019s predecessor, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, had also laid an extensive groundwork for closer ties with China. His administration upgraded bilateral relations twice \u2013 from a Strategic Partnership in 2005<\/a> to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2013<\/a> \u2013 and actively courted Chinese investment. Even symbolic gestures, such as issuing a Presidential decree<\/a> to replace the term \u201cCina\u201d with \u201cTiongkok\u201d in official usage, signalled a deliberate effort to normalize ties. Yet these moves did not provoke the same level of public backlash. Yudhoyono was never branded a \u201cChinese puppet\u201d in the way Jokowi was.
The difference lies less in policy than in politics. Under Jokowi, criticism was amplified by opposition groups, particularly Islamist movements<\/a> and hardliners, who were excluded from power. These groups wielded significant influence in shaping public opinion. They mobilized anti-China narratives as part of a broader effort of political contestation. During Yudhoyono\u2019s presidency, by contrast, many of these actors were accommodated within the governing coalition, dampening their incentive to oppose it.
This political dynamic has shifted again under Prabowo Subianto. His administration enjoys an overwhelming parliamentary majority through the Koalisi Indonesia Maju Plus, controlling roughly 80 percent of legislative seats<\/a>. More importantly, Prabowo has successfully consolidated support among Islamist groups, many of whom were once vocal critics of Jokowi. The result is a markedly quieter public sphere when it comes to foreign policy.
This absence of public criticism and media coverage is striking, given the controversies that have already emerged. The November 2024 joint statement<\/a> following Prabowo\u2019s state visit to Beijing, which included the phrase \u201cjoint development in areas of overlapping claims,\u201d drew concern from academics and policy observers. Yet it failed to trigger widespread public protest or sustained media scrutiny. Even The Jakarta Post<\/a> adopted a relatively measured tone, framing Prabowo\u2019s approach as a pragmatic effort to balance relations with China amid the anticipated return of Donald Trump to the White House.
Equally notable is the disappearance of narratives that once dominated public discourse. Anti-communist rhetoric linking China to atheism, which was frequently deployed against Jokowi, has largely faded in most media coverage. Islamist groups<\/a> that once mobilized anti-China sentiment now appear subdued, offering little more than mild statements even on issues of central concern to the Muslim world. Prabowo\u2019s engagement with initiatives such as Trump\u2019s \u201cBoard of Peace,\u201d for instance, have elicited only limited reaction, with organizations like the Majelis Ulama Indonesia<\/a> eventually softening their stance after direct engagement with the president.
What emerges from all of this is a paradox: at a time when foreign policy decisions are particularly consequential and sometimes controversial, public scrutiny has diminished. To claim that the media in Indonesia has fully and consistently become a channel for public representation would be na\u00efve. In practice, media independence in Indonesia is still constrained by a concentrated ownership structure.<\/a> \u00a0Reporters Without Borders<\/a> also reports that Indonesian business and political elites exploit a legal system that fails to adequately protect press freedom.
Meanwhile, public attention has shifted inward, preoccupied with domestic economic challenges, post-pandemic recovery, and flagship programs such as the Makan Bergizi Gratis<\/em><\/a> (Free Nutritious Meal) initiative.
This is not a functioning equilibrium. Foreign policy conducted without meaningful public oversight risks becoming overly personalized, shaped more by executive preference than by deliberative consensus. Indonesia\u2019s democratic strength has long depended on its capacity for open debate. Even when that debate is messy or polarized, it serves as a safeguard against demagoguery.
The task ahead is to restore balance. Media diversity should be nurtured for the sake of a fully-fledged democracy. Media institutions must move beyond episodic coverage and invest in deeper, more analytical reporting. Engaging academic expertise, contextualizing policy decisions, and resisting both sensationalism and complacency are essential steps toward a more constructive discourse.
Prabowo\u2019s foreign policy may be less noisy than his predecessor\u2019s. But quieter does not necessarily mean better. Without sustained public critical engagement, silence risks allowing flawed foreign policy decisions to pass unchecked.
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Already have an account? Brunei-gate<\/em><\/a> controversy under Abdurrahman Wahid, the Tangguh gas export deal<\/a> with China during Megawati Soekarnoputri\u2019s presidency, and the intense debates over China-related issues in the era of Joko \u201cJokowi\u201d Widodo all demonstrate that foreign policy has never been immune from domestic contestation. Media coverage has often amplified these debates. It somewhat turns diplomatic choices into matters of public judgment.
Nowhere was this more evident than in Indonesia\u2019s engagement with China under Jokowi. His administration elevated China into one of Indonesia\u2019s top three sources of foreign direct investment, particularly in terms of large-scale infrastructure projects. Yet this deepening partnership also prompted anxieties. The arrival of Chinese workers, who were often perceived to live exclusive, \u00a0insulated lives at worksites, sparked fears among local communities about job displacement. These concerns, at times, spilled into racialized narratives that dominated headlines and public discourse.
Media coverage played a central role in magnifying these sentiments. One of the most controversial moments came when Tempo magazine published its August\u2013September 2015 edition<\/a>, featuring a cover that depicted Jokowi with slanted eyes alongside the headline \u201cWelcome Chinese Laborers.\u201d The sentiment reached its peak during the COVID\u201119 pandemic. In April 2020, at the beginning of the pandemic, The Jakarta Post<\/a> reported on local distrust toward Chinese workers, framing it as a potential flashpoint in Indonesia\u2013China relations. Yet these examples were only a fraction of the overwhelming media attention devoted to the issue. The scale of the coverage often mismatched the complexity of the reality.
What makes this wave of criticism striking is its inconsistency. Jokowi\u2019s predecessor, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, had also laid an extensive groundwork for closer ties with China. His administration upgraded bilateral relations twice \u2013 from a Strategic Partnership in 2005<\/a> to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2013<\/a> \u2013 and actively courted Chinese investment. Even symbolic gestures, such as issuing a Presidential decree<\/a> to replace the term \u201cCina\u201d with \u201cTiongkok\u201d in official usage, signalled a deliberate effort to normalize ties. Yet these moves did not provoke the same level of public backlash. Yudhoyono was never branded a \u201cChinese puppet\u201d in the way Jokowi was.
The difference lies less in policy than in politics. Under Jokowi, criticism was amplified by opposition groups, particularly Islamist movements<\/a> and hardliners, who were excluded from power. These groups wielded significant influence in shaping public opinion. They mobilized anti-China narratives as part of a broader effort of political contestation. During Yudhoyono\u2019s presidency, by contrast, many of these actors were accommodated within the governing coalition, dampening their incentive to oppose it.
This political dynamic has shifted again under Prabowo Subianto. His administration enjoys an overwhelming parliamentary majority through the Koalisi Indonesia Maju Plus, controlling roughly 80 percent of legislative seats<\/a>. More importantly, Prabowo has successfully consolidated support among Islamist groups, many of whom were once vocal critics of Jokowi. The result is a markedly quieter public sphere when it comes to foreign policy.
This absence of public criticism and media coverage is striking, given the controversies that have already emerged. The November 2024 joint statement<\/a> following Prabowo\u2019s state visit to Beijing, which included the phrase \u201cjoint development in areas of overlapping claims,\u201d drew concern from academics and policy observers. Yet it failed to trigger widespread public protest or sustained media scrutiny. Even The Jakarta Post<\/a> adopted a relatively measured tone, framing Prabowo\u2019s approach as a pragmatic effort to balance relations with China amid the anticipated return of Donald Trump to the White House.
Equally notable is the disappearance of narratives that once dominated public discourse. Anti-communist rhetoric linking China to atheism, which was frequently deployed against Jokowi, has largely faded in most media coverage. Islamist groups<\/a> that once mobilized anti-China sentiment now appear subdued, offering little more than mild statements even on issues of central concern to the Muslim world. Prabowo\u2019s engagement with initiatives such as Trump\u2019s \u201cBoard of Peace,\u201d for instance, have elicited only limited reaction, with organizations like the Majelis Ulama Indonesia<\/a> eventually softening their stance after direct engagement with the president.
What emerges from all of this is a paradox: at a time when foreign policy decisions are particularly consequential and sometimes controversial, public scrutiny has diminished. To claim that the media in Indonesia has fully and consistently become a channel for public representation would be na\u00efve. In practice, media independence in Indonesia is still constrained by a concentrated ownership structure.<\/a> \u00a0Reporters Without Borders<\/a> also reports that Indonesian business and political elites exploit a legal system that fails to adequately protect press freedom.
Meanwhile, public attention has shifted inward, preoccupied with domestic economic challenges, post-pandemic recovery, and flagship programs such as the Makan Bergizi Gratis<\/em><\/a> (Free Nutritious Meal) initiative.
This is not a functioning equilibrium. Foreign policy conducted without meaningful public oversight risks becoming overly personalized, shaped more by executive preference than by deliberative consensus. Indonesia\u2019s democratic strength has long depended on its capacity for open debate. Even when that debate is messy or polarized, it serves as a safeguard against demagoguery.
The task ahead is to restore balance. Media diversity should be nurtured for the sake of a fully-fledged democracy. Media institutions must move beyond episodic coverage and invest in deeper, more analytical reporting. Engaging academic expertise, contextualizing policy decisions, and resisting both sensationalism and complacency are essential steps toward a more constructive discourse.
Prabowo\u2019s foreign policy may be less noisy than his predecessor\u2019s. But quieter does not necessarily mean better. Without sustained public critical engagement, silence risks allowing flawed foreign policy decisions to pass unchecked.
Klaus Heinrich Raditio is a Lecturer in Chinese Politics at Driyarkara School of Philosophy, Jakarta
Raka Pamungkas is a PhD Candidate in Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Sydney
Get briefed on the story of the week, and developing stories to watch across the Asia-Pacific. <\/p>\n

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Read The Diplomat, Know The Asia-PacificAt a time when Jakarta’s foreign policy decisions are particularly consequential and sometimes controversial, public scrutiny of them has strangely diminished.Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto shakes hands with Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese during a joint press conference in Jakarta, Indonesia, Feb. 6, 2026. From time to time, Indonesians have proven […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":14627,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[7],"tags":[],"class_list":{"0":"post-14626","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-politics"},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/globalnewstoday.uk\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/14626","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/globalnewstoday.uk\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/globalnewstoday.uk\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/globalnewstoday.uk\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/globalnewstoday.uk\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=14626"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/globalnewstoday.uk\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/14626\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/globalnewstoday.uk\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/14627"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/globalnewstoday.uk\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=14626"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/globalnewstoday.uk\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=14626"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/globalnewstoday.uk\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=14626"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}