04/09/2026: Google Ordered to Bargain with Alphabet Workers Union as Joint Employer – nlrbedge.com

The Board granted summary judgment against Google, LLC, finding it violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the NLRA by refusing to bargain with the Alphabet Workers Union-CWA Local 9009, which had been certified as representative of remote content creation workers supplied by joint employer Accenture Flex. Google contested the certification on the grounds that it was not a joint employer, but the Board held that joint employer status had been fully litigated in the underlying representation proceeding and could not be relitigated here. Google’s argument that changed circumstances — specifically, that it had stopped setting wage and benefit standards for Accenture Flex employees after the hearing — did not qualify as newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence. The Board extended the certification year under Mar-Jac Poultry Co. and declined to overrule Ex-Cell-O Corp., though Member Prouty dissented on that point, citing his position in Longmont United Hospital.
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 146 (1941): Established that representation issues resolved in a prior proceeding cannot be relitigated in a subsequent unfair labor practice case.
Mar-Jac Poultry Co., 136 NLRB 785 (1962): Holds that the certification year begins running from the date the employer commences good-faith bargaining.
East Michigan Care Corp., 246 NLRB 458 (1979): Evidence of circumstances that changed after the representation hearing does not constitute newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence.
Ex-Cell-O Corp., 185 NLRB 107 (1970): Declined to impose make-whole monetary remedies for an employer’s unlawful refusal to bargain.
Longmont United Hospital, 374 NLRB No. 52 (2026): Recent Board decision reaffirming the denial of expanded make-whole remedies for refusal-to-bargain violations under Ex-Cell-O Corp.
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The Board adopted the ALJ’s findings that Prime Communications violated Section 8(a)(1) by issuing and maintaining severance agreements with unlawfully overbroad nondisparagement and confidentiality provisions. The Board’s analysis centered on McLaren Macomb, which the ALJ applied as controlling precedent. Notably, Chairman Murphy and Member Mayer applied McLaren Macomb as extant precedent while signaling openness to reconsideration in a future appropriate case — but with no three-member majority to overrule it, they applied it here.
The nondisparagement provisions required employees to refrain from any negative remarks about Prime, its business, and affiliated personnel; prohibited former employees from contacting any Prime employee; barred voluntary assistance to any agency or third party in actions adverse to Prime; and directed employees to notify Prime if contacted for information related to pending or future adverse actions. The ALJ found these provisions more restrictive than the language condemned in McLaren Macomb and not narrowly tailored. The confidentiality provisions — prohibiting disclosure of even the existence of the agreements, backed by $5,000-per-breach penalties — were also found unlawfully broad. The Board ordered Prime to rescind the overbroad language and notify all affected former employees in writing.
McLaren Macomb, 372 NLRB No. 48 (2023): Established that proffering or maintaining severance agreements with provisions that restrict employees’ Section 7 rights violates the NLRA, and that the agreement’s language — not the circumstances of its proffer — is the primary consideration.
NLRB v. Electrical Workers Local 1229 (Jefferson Standard Broadcasting Co.), 346 U.S. 464 (1953): Supreme Court decision establishing that Section 7 protects employee communications with third parties related to ongoing labor disputes, provided the communications are not disloyal, reckless, or maliciously untrue.
Baylor University Medical Center, 369 NLRB No. 43 (2020): Board decision overruled by McLaren Macomb that had shifted focus away from agreement language to the circumstances of the proffer.
Stericycle, Inc., 372 NLRB No. 113 (2023): Applied the principle that retroactive application of a new standard is not manifestly unjust where the remedy is merely an order to rescind overbroad language.
Metro Networks, Inc., 336 NLRB 63 (2001): Pre-Baylor precedent cited approvingly in McLaren Macomb for the proposition that severance agreement provisions restricting Section 7 rights are independently unlawful regardless of other employer conduct.
The Board adopted an ALJ’s findings that ILA Local 1526 violated the NLRA in two respects. First, Local President Johnnie Dixon made repeated threats to retaliate against hiring hall users who filed NLRB charges or testified in Board proceedings — telling members that those who filed charges “would be dealt with” and telling a witness in a prior proceeding “I always get get-backs” — in violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A). Second, the Local breached its duty of fair representation to member Tony Williams in connection with his seniority claim for the 2019–2020 contract year, in violation of Sections 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(2). The ALJ found the breach under both a fair representation analysis and a Wright Line discrimination analysis. The Board affirmed without addressing the General Counsel’s exception seeking additional, more specific findings, concluding they would not materially affect the remedy.
The Board modified the ALJ’s make-whole remedy to apply the Ogle Protection Service formula rather than F.W. Woolworth Co., applicable where the violation does not involve loss of employment or interim earnings that would reduce backpay over time. The Board also declined to order a letter of apology to Williams. Applying Thryv, Chairman Murphy and Member Mayer noted they would be open to reconsidering that precedent but applied it in the absence of a majority to overrule it.
Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967): Established that a union breaches its duty of fair representation when its conduct is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith.
Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980): Established the burden-shifting framework for analyzing discriminatory motivation in adverse employment actions.
Thryv, Inc., 372 NLRB No. 22 (2022): Expanded Board remedies to include compensation for direct and foreseeable pecuniary harms beyond lost wages.
Ogle Protection Service, 183 NLRB 682 (1970): Established the make-whole remedy formula applicable where the violation does not involve loss of employment status or interim earnings.
Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953): Held that a union must make an honest effort to serve the interests of all members without hostility in performing its representative function.
The Board granted summary judgment against Jetstream Ground Services, an aviation ground support company at Charlotte Douglas International Airport, for refusing to bargain with SEIU Local 32BJ following the Union’s certification in May 2023.
Jetstream admitted its refusal to bargain but challenged the certification on two grounds: that the bargaining unit was inappropriate, and that the NLRA did not apply because the company was subject to the Railway Labor Act. The Board rejected both arguments, holding that all representation issues were litigated — or could have been litigated — in the underlying representation proceeding and could not be relitigated in an unfair labor practice case.
Jetstream also argued the case was moot because it had dissolved its business and no longer employed unit employees. The Board rejected that argument as well, reaffirming that business discontinuance does not automatically moot unfair labor practice allegations, and that a Board order binds successors regardless of closure.
The Board ordered Jetstream to bargain on request, with the certification year to begin running from the date good-faith bargaining commences.
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 146 (1941): Established that representation issues resolved in a prior proceeding cannot be relitigated in a subsequent unfair labor practice case.
Redway Carriers, 301 NLRB 1113 (1991): Held that mere discontinuance of business does not necessarily render unfair labor practice allegations moot.
Mar-Jac Poultry Co., 136 NLRB 785 (1962): Established that the certification year begins running from the date an employer commences good-faith bargaining, not from the certification date.
New Process Steel v. NLRB, 560 U.S. 674 (2010): Confirmed the Board’s authority to issue decisions with a two-member quorum when a panel member is recused.
Bluefield Hospital Co., LLC, 361 NLRB 1389 (2014): Clarified that an employer cannot defend an earlier refusal to bargain by pointing to subsequent events, though subsequent events may be raised in compliance proceedings.
The Board affirmed in part and reversed in part an ALJ decision arising from a commercial laundry employer’s September 2021 withdrawal of recognition based on a decertification petition.
Withdrawal of recognition: The Board found the decertification petition tainted by unlawful employer assistance. Departing from the ALJ—who relied solely on the employer’s tolerance of petition circulation during work time—the Board based its finding on a direct solicitation theory: Plant Manager Hathaway personally solicited employees to sign the petition alongside the employee circulating it. The Board invoked Pergament United States to reach this unalleged violation, finding it closely connected to the complaint and fully litigated. Because the petition was tainted, the withdrawal violated Section 8(a)(5).
Union access: The Board found three specific access violations the ALJ had not squarely resolved: (1) refusal on June 17, 2021 to send new employees to the breakroom to meet the union agent, departing from established practice; (2) prohibition in early September 2021 of a union steward from meeting employees outside the Belzano facility; and (3) denial of access to Belzano and Johnstown in mid-September 2021. The Board also grounded the September violations in Bottom Line Enterprises, holding that during active successor bargaining, the employer could not implement any unilateral change absent overall impasse—regardless of whether notice and opportunity to bargain had been given. The Board rejected the employer’s argument that the management-rights clause authorized unilateral access changes, finding that argument foreclosed under both Endurance Environmental Solutions (clear-and-unmistakable waiver) and MV Transportation (contract coverage), because the recognition clause expressly addressed union access rights. Chairman Murphy and Member Mayer reserved judgment on whether Endurance was correctly decided.
Unilateral wage increase: The Board adopted the ALJ’s finding that the employer’s August 2021 wage increase violated Section 8(a)(5), rejecting the employer’s contract-based defense because the agreement had expired before the increase was implemented.
Surveillance: The Board affirmed the ALJ’s dismissal. Gamble’s presence at a public bus stop was consistent with his normal duties, and no atypical conduct suggested deliberate observation of union activity. Member Prouty dissented on this point, finding that a supervisor’s follow-up inquiry the next day would lead reasonable employees to believe their union activity had been reported and monitored.
Interrogation: Reversing the ALJ, the Board found a Section 8(a)(1) interrogation where a supervisor approached an employee one-on-one and asked whether employees had received union voting materials, shortly after the unlawful withdrawal of recognition.
Statements about union status: Reversing the ALJ, the Board found violations based on statements by management on and after September 9, 2021, telling employees the union was “gone” and dues would no longer be deducted—conduct that amplified the unlawful withdrawal and further negated the union’s representative status in employees’ eyes.
Subpoena threat: The Board adopted the ALJ’s finding that Plant Manager Hathaway violated Section 8(a)(1) by telling employee Wilson she would not comply with a Board subpoena “because Dick’s got lawyers,” constituting an implied threat of retaliation. The Board rejected the employer’s repudiation defense under Passavant Memorial Area Hospital, finding Hathaway’s later statement that Wilson “had to go” did not address or retract the retaliation threat.
Pergament United States, 296 NLRB 333 (1989): Establishes that the Board may find and remedy an unalleged violation if it is closely connected to the complaint’s subject matter and was fully litigated.
Bottom Line Enterprises, 302 NLRB 373 (1991): During active bargaining for a successor agreement, an employer must refrain from all unilateral changes absent overall impasse, not merely provide notice and an opportunity to bargain.
SFO Good-Nite Inn, LLC, 352 NLRB 268 (2008): When an employer unlawfully assists a decertification effort, the resulting petition is tainted and reliance on it to withdraw recognition violates Section 8(a)(5).
Passavant Memorial Area Hospital, 237 NLRB 138 (1978): To effectively repudiate unlawful conduct, an employer’s disavowal must be timely, unambiguous, and specifically address the coercive conduct.
Turtle Bay Resorts, 355 NLRB 1272 (2010): A unilateral change in an employer’s policy permitting union access to its premises impairs representation rights and violates Section 8(a)(5).
The Board affirmed the ALJ’s findings that ILA Local 1694 violated NLRA Section 8(b)(1)(A) by threatening Standford Fowler after he wrote a letter to the ILA International complaining about a local merger, and violated Sections 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) by refusing to refer him through its exclusive hiring hall from March 31, 2021 through March 1, 2022, and again on March 5, 2022. Both violations were sustained under the Wright Line discriminatory-motivation framework and the duty-of-fair-representation framework.
The Board reversed the ALJ on one issue: whether the Local’s unlawful conduct caused Fowler to reasonably stop seeking referrals after March 5, 2022. The ALJ had dismissed this allegation, concluding Fowler voluntarily chose not to return. The Board disagreed, applying the futility doctrine: where a respondent’s unlawful conduct reasonably leads an applicant to believe that seeking referrals would be futile, a refusal-to-refer violation exists even without a specific referral request. The Board found that the Local’s year-long refusal to refer Fowler, followed by his forcible removal from the Port just days after being readmitted, combined with the Local’s failure to clarify the scope of GT USA’s limited administrative suspension, collectively gave Fowler a reasonable basis to believe further attempts would be futile. The Board also rejected the ALJ’s inference that Fowler’s decision to pursue an unfair labor practice charge rather than attend a belated grievance hearing demonstrated intent to abandon seeking work.
The remedy includes backpay, Thryv expanded make-whole relief for direct or foreseeable pecuniary harms, and a public notice reading at a union meeting — the last remedy ordered in light of the seriousness and duration of the violations and the involvement of the Local’s senior officers.
Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980): Established the burden-shifting framework for analyzing discriminatory-motivation unfair labor practice allegations.
Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967): Supreme Court decision holding that a union breaches its duty of fair representation when its conduct toward a unit employee is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith.
Pipeline Local Union No. 38 (Hancock-Northwest, J.V.), 247 NLRB 1250 (1980): Held that a refusal-to-refer violation can be found even where an applicant stopped seeking referrals, if the respondent’s unlawful conduct made doing so futile.
Thryv, Inc., 372 NLRB No. 22 (2022): Established the Board’s expanded make-whole remedy requiring compensation for all direct or foreseeable pecuniary harms beyond lost wages.
Construction & General Laborers, Local 304 (Associated General Contractors of California, Inc.), 265 NLRB 602 (1982): Found a refusal-to-refer violation where a union’s failure to clarify a misunderstanding about its referral procedures foreseeably discouraged an applicant from seeking work.
The Board denied Browning-Ferris’s motion for reconsideration of its Second Supplemental Decision and Order finding Browning-Ferris a joint employer of Leadpoint Business Services employees and requiring it to bargain with Teamsters Local 350.
Browning-Ferris argued that any bargaining obligation should be limited to the specific terms and conditions it was found to actually control or co-control. The Board rejected this, explaining that the threshold question of whether a joint employer must bargain is analytically distinct from what it must bargain about. The Board applied the same standard bargaining order language it has long used in test-of-certification cases for joint employers generally, noting that the scope of Browning-Ferris’s specific bargaining obligations was not properly before the Board in this proceeding and could not be resolved on the existing record.
Browning-Ferris Industries of California, Inc. d/b/a BFI Newby Island Recyclery, 362 NLRB 1599 (2015): Established the Board’s joint-employer standard holding that indirect or reserved control over employees can be sufficient to find joint-employer status.
Browning-Ferris Industries of California, Inc., 363 NLRB 883 (2016): Found Browning-Ferris violated Section 8(a)(5) by refusing to recognize and bargain with the union as representative of the joint-employer unit.
Retro Environmental, Inc./Green JobWorks, LLC, 365 NLRB 1327 (2017): Applied standard test-of-certification bargaining order language to joint employers.
Joint Employer Status Under the National Labor Relations Act, 85 Fed. Reg. 11184 (2020): Rulemaking noting that the duty to bargain as a joint employer is analytically prior to and distinct from the scope of that bargaining obligation.
Greyhound Corp., 153 NLRB 1488 (1965): Ordered joint employer respondents to bargain over standard terms and conditions of employment following the Supreme Court’s joint-employer ruling in Boire v. Greyhound Corp.
The Board reversed an ALJ’s dismissal and found that American Postal Workers Union, Local 512 violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) by failing to process a member’s grievances and by providing her with fabricated tracking and case numbers in response to her requests for grievance documentation.
Union steward Curt Kretzer promised member JoAnn Britt he would file grievances over her 2017 emergency placement and discharge, then spent two years lying about having done so — ultimately texting her fake tracking and case numbers. The ALJ agreed that Kretzer’s conduct would have violated the Act but dismissed the complaint as time-barred under Section 10(b), finding that Britt had constructive notice of the violation by late 2017 or early 2018 when she learned the National Union had no record of her grievances.
The Board majority disagreed on the timeliness question. It held that the Respondent — which bears the burden on a Section 10(b) affirmative defense — failed to establish that Britt had clear and unequivocal notice before November 8, 2018 (six months before her charge was served). The majority emphasized that Kretzer’s continuous false assurances, his active involvement in Britt’s parallel EEO matter, and the equivocal nature of what she heard from other union representatives created conflicting signals that reasonably delayed her filing. On the merits, the Board found both violations: the failure to process grievances was arbitrary and in bad faith under Vaca v. Sipes, and the provision of false information independently violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) under Postal Workers, 328 NLRB 281 (1999).
Member Prouty dissented, agreeing with the ALJ that by early 2018 Britt possessed facts sufficient to trigger the limitations period and that her inaction for eight or more months thereafter rendered the charge untimely.
The remedy requires the Union to request that USPS consider Britt’s grievances, permit her to retain personal counsel at any grievance proceeding at the Union’s expense, and — if the grievances cannot be pursued and the General Counsel demonstrates they would have succeeded — make Britt whole with interest.
Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967): Established that a union breaches its duty of fair representation by acting toward bargaining unit employees in a manner that is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith.
Airline Pilots Association v. O’Neill, 499 U.S. 65 (1991): Held that a union’s conduct must fall outside a wide range of reasonableness — that is, be wholly irrational or arbitrary — to constitute a breach of the duty of fair representation.
Postal Workers, 328 NLRB 281 (1999): Found that a union steward violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) by lying about grievance filings and activity, thereby willfully misinforming an employee about the status of her representation.
St. Barnabas Medical Center, 343 NLRB 1125 (2004): Held that the Section 10(b) limitations period does not begin until the charging party has clear and unequivocal notice — actual or constructive — of facts supporting a ripe unfair labor practice charge.
A & L Underground, 302 NLRB 467 (1991): Established that a charging party’s delay in filing will not bar a charge when that delay results from conflicting signals or otherwise ambiguous conduct by the other party.
The Sixth Circuit denied Rieth-Riley Construction Company’s petition for review and enforced the NLRB’s order requiring the company to bargain in good faith with Local 324, International Union of Operating Engineers. The case stemmed from a dispute that began in 2018 when the Union withdrew from a multiemployer bargaining arrangement to negotiate individually with Rieth-Riley and others.
Withdrawal from multiemployer bargaining. The court upheld the Board’s finding that the Union timely withdrew from the multiemployer unit. Drawing on Retail Associates and Charles D. Bonanno Linen Service, the court held that withdrawal is permissible any time before negotiations actually commence — regardless of whether a contract-modification deadline has passed. Because no real bargaining had begun when the Union gave notice in May 2018, the withdrawal was lawful. The court rejected Rieth-Riley’s argument that the Union had to satisfy both the contract-modification deadline and the pre-negotiations window, noting that Retail Associates‘s use of the disjunctive “or” permits withdrawal under either condition.
Unfair labor practices. Because the withdrawal was valid, the court affirmed that Rieth-Riley violated §§ 8(a)(1) and (5) of the NLRA by: (1) continuing to insist on multiemployer bargaining, (2) unilaterally granting wage increases in 2018 and 2020 without providing the Union notice and an opportunity to bargain, and (3) locking out bargaining-unit employees. On the 2018 benefit-fund clawback, the court found no economic exigency excusing the unilateral action — the company had known for at least a month before acting that it was in a §9(a) bargaining relationship and had effectively created the problem itself.
Strike characterization. The Board reversed the ALJ and found the 2019 strike was an unfair-labor-practice strike, at least in part. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Evidence showed that employees remained aggrieved by the prior lockout, picket signs referenced the company’s unfair labor practices, and the General Counsel’s complaint had been distributed and discussed at the pre-strike membership meeting. Under Larand Leisurelies, unfair labor practices need only be “contributing causes” — not the primary driver — for a strike to qualify as an unfair-labor-practice strike.
Bargaining order. The court declined to review Rieth-Riley’s challenge to the Board’s affirmative bargaining order because the company failed to raise it before the Board, and identified no extraordinary circumstances excusing that failure under § 10(e) of the NLRA.
Charles D. Bonanno Linen Service, Inc. v. NLRB, 454 U.S. 404 (1982): Established that parties may withdraw from a multiemployer bargaining unit at any time before negotiations commence, provided adequate notice is given.
Retail Associates, Inc., 120 NLRB 388 (1958): Board decision setting the framework for permissible withdrawal from multiemployer bargaining units, requiring notice prior to the contract-modification deadline or the commencement of negotiations.
Larand Leisurelies, Inc. v. NLRB, 523 F.2d 814 (6th Cir. 1975): Held that a strike qualifies as an unfair-labor-practice strike when employer misconduct is a contributing cause, even if not the primary motivation.
NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962): Established that an employer’s unilateral change to mandatory subjects of bargaining violates § 8(a)(5) of the NLRA because it circumvents the duty to bargain.
Litton Financial Printing Division v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 190 (1991): Held that an employer commits an unfair labor practice by altering wages, hours, or working conditions without bargaining with the union.
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