Author : Udayan Das
External partnerships can advance Northeast connectivity, but only under India-led frameworks that align interests, manage risks, and preserve strategic control in a sensitive region
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Despite policy commitments and substantial investments, connectivity in India’s Northeast remains a persistent challenge. India has expanded engagement with like-minded democracies and Quad members such as Japan and the United States, collaborating on issues including maritime security, technology, and resilient supply chains. The key question is whether such collaboration can strengthen connectivity in the Northeast while advancing India’s interests without unsettling the region’s delicate geopolitical balance. Lessons from Japan’s engagement with India in infrastructure, mobility, and economic security initiatives, however, suggest that external state collaboration in conflict-sensitive geographies such as the Northeast is feasible when pursued under clearly defined conditions.
Bringing in like-minded external actors offers clear gains in capacity building. It diversifies financing sources, enables technology and knowledge transfer, and can improve efficiency in project execution and service delivery. However, such collaboration is not straightforward in a security-sensitive context such as the Northeast. Connectivity projects in the conflict-ridden Northeast are fragmented and discontinuous, with infrastructure bypassing conflict-prone areas and clustering in secure pockets, while remaining vulnerable to disruption from sudden conflict escalations. In this context, three conditions are critical.
Lessons from Japan’s engagement with India in infrastructure, mobility, and economic security initiatives, however, suggest that external state collaboration in conflict-sensitive geographies such as the Northeast is feasible when pursued under clearly defined conditions.
First, partnerships must be anchored in clearly aligned and sustainable mutual interests, particularly amid geopolitical uncertainty. States investing in conflict-affected geographies must be patient in seeking returns. Quick turnarounds are unlikely, as socio-economic ruptures must be addressed and a culture of trade and mobility must be developed.
Second, India should retain full strategic primacy over project design and implementation, ensuring that partner states neither pursue territorial claims nor enable economic extraction, and that collaboration proceeds under host-state leadership.
Finally, external partners must demonstrate both independent and convergent interests. Such partnerships are more durable when structured as collaborative ventures rather than unidirectional aid flows. For instance, Japan’s engagement in the Northeast generates outcomes aligned with India’s development priorities while also supporting Japan’s broader objective of supply chain diversification across the Bay of Bengal region. India has welcomed such investment, given its alignment with capacity-building objectives and its sensitivity to strategic concerns.
The Northeast region accounts for nearly 46 percent of India’s land border with Bangladesh and the entirety of its border with Myanmar. It has, therefore, been progressively reimagined under the Act East Policy, shifting from a landlocked to a land-linked geography. This framing positions the region as India’s gateway to Southeast Asia, where deeper regional integration holds significant potential for economic transformation.
India should retain full strategic primacy over project design and implementation, ensuring that partner states neither pursue territorial claims nor enable economic extraction, and that collaboration proceeds under host-state leadership.
Connectivity is expected to create trade corridors and social exchange, opening up areas that have long remained constrained by conflict and instability. This could generate greater prosperity and mobility by addressing structural drivers of underdevelopment, including limited economic opportunity and constrained flows of capital, goods, and people. If connectivity delivers these outcomes, it could gradually reduce incentives for conflict, strengthening the case for using foreign policy as an instrument of domestic transformation.
Yet, the Northeast illustrates a complex connectivity paradox for India. While New Delhi cannot, and should not, bypass the region in its eastward strategy, translating connectivity plans into effective outcomes remains difficult due to three interrelated challenges: approach, execution, and uncertainty.
I. Historical and Security Constraints
India’s Partition in 1947 was followed by prolonged political turbulence and insurgencies, contributing to the Northeast’s isolation and disrupted connectivity networks. Given that these security concerns persist, the state’s approach to connectivity development is unlikely to shift, despite policy efforts to enhance regional accessibility. Connectivity is therefore likely to remain tightly regulated and closely monitored, with political considerations often outweighing economic efficiency and the facilitation of human mobility.
Another challenge lies in execution. Connectivity projects in politically sensitive areas are likely to be shaped by careful strategic calibration. This necessitates continuous assessment of what is to be connected, with whom, and through which modalities. Risk containment, however, may result in a fragmented or partially operational infrastructure that functions within constrained and selective corridors. In addition, the planning, deployment, and maintenance of infrastructure across the Northeast’s difficult terrain pose significant operational challenges.
Transnational connectivity initiatives depend heavily on the stability of neighbouring states through which such linkages must pass. For instance, enhanced connectivity between the Northeast and the Bay of Bengal, or reduced travel time between Kolkata and Northeastern cities, is contingent on transit through Myanmar or Bangladesh. While the region is correctly framed as a gateway to Southeast Asia, it remains geopolitically exposed to developments in both Myanmar and Bangladesh. Cooperation with Dhaka had previously served as a cornerstone of India’s neighbourhood strategy and strengthened connectivity in the Northeast; however, the political upheaval in Bangladesh in August 2024 altered this trajectory, disrupting several operational projects and placing others in abeyance. Consequently, the effectiveness of connectivity in and out of the region remains partly contingent on India’s foreign policy engagement with its immediate neighbours.
Japan serves as a useful illustration of India’s approach to involving external partners in Northeast connectivity. The India–Japan Act East Forum was established in 2017 to coordinate joint initiatives in the region and has held regular dialogues since 2021. The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) has committed approximately JPY 314 billion for projects in the Northeast. The major project involves the Dhubri–Phulbari Bridge over the Brahmaputra, which is expected to reduce travel time between Assam and Meghalaya. Other projects include widening of the Khowai–Harina highway in Tripura, as well as highway upgradation works in Meghalaya and Mizoram.
There are several reasons why India and Japan have been able to cooperate effectively in Northeast connectivity. First, Tokyo has no territorial ambitions in the region, and its economic diplomacy has generally avoided debt-heavy or politically controversial financing models. Its investments are largely technical in nature and focused on infrastructure delivery.
Second, rather than pursuing large-scale strategic designs, Japan’s interventions have strengthened physical infrastructure and connectivity in ways that are incremental but impactful. These projects align with India’s broader objective of developing an integrated Northeast and advancing the Act East agenda. Given the continued constraints on overland connectivity with Myanmar and Bangladesh, strengthening intra-regional connectivity within the Northeast remains a pragmatic priority.
The experience with Japan suggests that connectivity projects in conflict-sensitive geographies are feasible when governed by clearly defined parameters, supported by coordination mechanisms, and underpinned by transparency of intent.
Finally, Japan’s engagement is also shaped by independent geoeconomic interests. These incentives are crucial for sustaining its involvement over time. Tokyo increasingly views Northeast India as part of a broader Bay of Bengal connectivity and supply chain network, where it seeks to establish itself as an economic stakeholder. This convergence ensures that its developmental objectives are not in tension with India’s strategic priorities.
The Japan case thus illustrates how external engagement can be made compatible with India’s strategic sensitivities when structured through clear institutional and operational safeguards.
A combination of overlapping interests, mutual trust, and pragmatic coordination has enabled Japanese engagement in the Northeast to progress. If other external actors seek to engage in the region, they will need to factor in India’s strategic sensitivities and developmental priorities. Such partnerships carry both potential gains and risks for New Delhi. The experience with Japan suggests that connectivity projects in conflict-sensitive geographies are feasible when governed by clearly defined parameters, supported by coordination mechanisms, and underpinned by transparency of intent.
Overall, external participation in Northeast connectivity remains conditional. Its viability depends on India’s ability to preserve strategic control while aligning external capital and expertise with domestic development priorities.
Udayan Das teaches at the Department of Political Science, St. Xavier’s College (Autonomous), Kolkata.
Udayan Das is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science, St. Xavier’s College (Autonomous), Kolkata, and a Visiting Fellow at Asian Confluence, Shillong. …
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